Hamed Ghadiri
Abstract
During the 80s, Hilary Putnam developed a metaphysical viewpoint called 'internal realism'. Its slogan said, "the mind and the world together make up the mind and the world." According to Putnam, internal realism has two elements: 1) conceptual relativity and 2) seeing truth as idealized rational assertability. ...
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During the 80s, Hilary Putnam developed a metaphysical viewpoint called 'internal realism'. Its slogan said, "the mind and the world together make up the mind and the world." According to Putnam, internal realism has two elements: 1) conceptual relativity and 2) seeing truth as idealized rational assertability. Here it will be argued that there is an internal incompatibility in the second element; i.e. truth as idealized rational assertability. To explain this incompatibility, firstly it will be shown that the idealization of rational assertability is duo to Putnam's emphasis on realistic intuitions of truth. Secondly, it will be shown that Putnam prefers to use 'sufficiently good conditions' instead of 'ideal conditions' to make a distinction between his idea and pierce's. Finally, it will be argued that some implication of 'sufficiently good conditions' is incompatible with those realistic intuitions of truth. Hence, one can conclude that there is an incompatibility in Putnam's attitude toward truth.
hamed ghadiri; mohammad saeedi mehr
Abstract
Rejecting metaphysical realism (MR) is a basic element in Putnam's Philosophy. He introduces two arguments against MR: Model-theoretic (MT) and brain-in-vat (BIV). However, according to some scholars and commentators who work on Putnam's Philosophy, the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, as introduced ...
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Rejecting metaphysical realism (MR) is a basic element in Putnam's Philosophy. He introduces two arguments against MR: Model-theoretic (MT) and brain-in-vat (BIV). However, according to some scholars and commentators who work on Putnam's Philosophy, the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, as introduced by Putnam in some of his books, is another argument by which MR is rejected. This Phenomenon is a state in which two sentences that are at face value incompatible could be consistently true. However, there is not any explicit and complete formulation of this argument in the writings of Putnam and his commentators. In this paper, first we will formulate a version of conceptual relativity against MR. According to our version, Putnam ask the metaphysical realist to explain this phenomenon. Then we will show that this argument is not independent of MT and BIV. Therefore, the phenomenon of conceptual relativity could be an argument against MR only of we accept either MT or BIV. Furthermore, any objection to MT and BIV will weaken the argument from conceptual relativity against MR.
